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INTRODUCTION
Over the past quarter century, conflicts over large dam projects'
have become more frequent, widespread, and acrimonious. The
intensity of the conflicts between the proponents and the opponents
of large dam projects has complicated water and energy management
in many countries. The World Commission on Dams ("WCD") was
established to try to find a resolution to this problem. Its task was to
study the impacts and costs and benefits of existing large dams and
to see if it could develop "recommendations, policies, standards,
[and] guidelines ' '2 that could assist in reducing the conflict generated
by future decisions relating to large dam projects.
The opponents of dams argue that governments decide to build
dams without paying adequate attention to their associated social and
environmental costs, thereby causing them to be understated and
externalized. They also argue that the proponents of dams are too
eager to find reasons to build dams and thus under-value other ways
of meeting society's water and energy needs. In addition, they
contend that the sponsors of dam projects make decisions about the
projects in ways that are not very transparent and do not offer all
those who the proposed dam projects will affect an opportunity to
participate in the decision-making.
The proponents of dams believe that dams are an efficient and
effective way to manage the water and energy needs of human

1. The World Commission on Dams ("WCD") defined a "large dam" as a
dam with a height of at least 15 m from the foundation or a dam that is between 515 m high and has a reservoir volume of more than 3 million m'. This is the
definition used by International Commission on Large Dams ("ICOLD"). See
WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK

FOR DECISION MAKING 11, Box 1.2 (Earthscan 2000) [hereinafter WCD REIPORT].
2. Large Dams: Learningfrom the Past, Looking at the Future: Workshop
Proceedings,Gland, Switzerland, IUCN and the World Bank (1997), at 10.
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society. They argue that that their opponents over-estimate the
capacity of alternatives to dams to meet the growing water and
energy needs of human societies. They also contend that their
opponents under-estimate the benefits of dams and the costs of more
transparent, participatory, and publicly accountable decision-making
processes. Moreover, they argue that there is a risk that these costs
could be so high that they effectively make it impossible to build
dams. Many proponents also believe that decisions about the broader
social and environmental effects of dams are political decisions that
should be resolved through the political process and not through the
specific project's decision-making process.
This brief description suggests that the underlying conflict
between the proponents and opponents of dams is not so much about
dams per se as it is about governance and perceptions of the
appropriate way in which societies should make decisions about
water and energy projects. At the intellectual heart of this debate is a
disagreement about what constitutes desirable "development
decision- making." By "development decision-making," I mean the
way in which individuals, groups, and institutions decide to adopt
and then implement policies, programs, and projects that affect the
evolution of either their own and/or other's social and physical
environments. The issue of development decision-making is
applicable to all societies regardless of their level of development;
and it applies to decision-making at the local, national, and
international level in both the public and private sectors.
Thirty or forty years ago, all interested parties shared a common
view of appropriate development decision-making. They premised
this view on a clear distinction between political and social issues
and technical and economic issues. They agreed to address decisions
about environmental and social issues through the political process,
while addressing technical and economic issues in a project or
program specific decision-making process.
Today, this general agreement has broken down, and we are now
involved in a complicated process of trying to develop a new model
of development decision-making that is generally acceptable to all
stakeholders. While the various participants in the debates about
development decision-making all have their own views on the
subject, their views tend to cluster around two idealized visions of

1534

Am. U. INTL L. REV.

[16:1531

development decision-making. The first vision is the original view,
which in this paper is referred to as the "traditional" view of
decision-making for development. The second vision is a new, still
evolving view, which in this paper is called the "modem" vision of
development decision-making. Since these are both idealized visions,
they are not necessarily an accurate description of the views of any
particular group.
This debate about development decision-making is occurring in
other contexts besides dams. This debate is being waged in many
decision-making structures at the local, national, and international
level. These include the controversies that have surrounded natural
resource and physical infrastructure projects in many countries,' the
conflicts surrounding corporate relocation decisions, 4 and the
protests against the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in Seattle in
3. See generally, Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries:
Can They, Be Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Humans Rights

Violations?, 23

BROOK.

J.

INT'L

L. 927, 958-60 (noting the conflict over the

environmental impact of Shell Oil operations in Nigeria); Chilean, Bolivian
PresidentsMeet in Brasilia, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 1, 2000, available at
2000 WL 25639192 (discussing a road project designed to link Bolivia, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Chile); Rio Believes It Can Weather Slowdown, TIMES (London),
Apr. 13, 2001 availableat 2001 WL 4891452 (discussing opposition to a uranium
mining project in northern Australia); Japan:Airport Projects Take Wing, TRAVEL
TRADE GAZETTE ASIA, May 19, 2000 available at 2000 WL 15017781 (describing
airport construction in Japan); WORLD BANK, Project Information, at
http://www4.worldbank.org/sprojects/Project.asp?pid=P048202
(last
modified
June 5, 2001) (describing a pipeline project in Chad-Cameroon); Indonesian Court
Opens Environmental Suit Against Freeport, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Mar. 8, 2001
available at 2001 WL 2357429 (detailing a lawsuit filed by an environmental
group against Freeport Indonesia for its mining activities that have degraded the
environment).
4. See Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive:
Transnational Formation and Consultation in the European Union, 18 COMVIP.
LAB. L.J. 325, 346-349 (1997) (discussing a controversial Vredeling draft directive
in 1980 by the European Commission that sought to oblige employers to disclose
information to employees and consult with them on certain corporate decisions).
See generally ROGER BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (Kluwer 1977) (analyzing industrial relations
between large multinational enterprises and local societies of smaller nations
where they locate business operations); BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT
HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA (1982) (examining plant
closings and their relation to the problem of private industrial development in the
United States).
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1999 and against the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and
World Bank in Prague in 2000. The protests against the various
aspects of structural adjustment policies that have taken place in
many countries around the world implicate the same issue.
The participants in all these protests are motivated by a broad
range of often inconsistent and incompatible social, economic,
environmental, cultural, and political concerns. However, these
protestors all share a common concern with other stakeholders in
development decision-making. In particular, like the opponents of
dams, they seek to broaden the range of issues that decision-makers
consider, and expand the range of actors who can participate in
development decision-making at the local, national, and international
level. Furthermore, they aim to ensure that people and governments
hold key decision-makers accountable for the decisions they make
and their consequences. Their opponents, like the supporters of
dams, are relatively satisfied with the current approach to
development decision-making. The similarities in the view of the
protagonists in the dams and these other debates suggest that the
WCD's proposals for decision-making are relevant to this broader
debate about development decision-making as well as to dams.
This paper explores the relevance of the WCD's proposed
decision-making framework to the broader debate over development
decision-making. The first section of the paper will describe the two
idealized views of decision-making for development. This section
will also discuss the implications of each vision for their proponents'
understanding of development: the role that participation,
accountability, and democracy play in each vision; and the
implications of the vision for sovereignty. The second section will
focus on the WCD's report and its proposal for decision-making in
the case of dams. The third section will discuss the relevance of the
WCD report to the broader debate on development decision-making.
The final section will discuss some unresolved issues that arise from
the WCD proposal and that are also relevant to the broader debate
over development decision-making. It will also contain some
comments on the contributions that law and lawyers can make to the
resolution of this debate.
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I. TWO VIEWS OF DEVELOPMENT DECISIONMAKING
A. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING
The proponents of the traditional view see development as an
economic process whose outputs are discrete projects and specific
economic policies that are designed to achieve the highest possible
rate of economic growth. Thus, they argue that development
decision-makers should focus on designing and constructing the
projects and policies that produce economic growth as efficiently
(i.e. as quickly and cheaply) as possible.
The proponents of this view understand that the social,
environmental, political, and cultural impacts of development are
important but see them as being outside the scope of their specific
concerns as development decision-makers. They perceive these
issues as the prerogative of the society that is building the project or
implementing the policy. This means that they see these other factors
as issues that governments and societies must address through other
decision-making processes - primarily the political process.
One consequence of drawing this distinction between these two
categories of issues is that the proponents of this view divide
development decision-makers into two categories. The first is the
political development decision-makers. This group consists of those
people the society has chosen through the political process to make
the important political, social, and environmental decisions facing a
society. The second category is the technical development decisionmakers. This group consists of all those decision-makers in the
public and private sectors that have to make development decisions
within the constraints of the decisions made by the political decisionmakers. While technical development decision-makers can, as
citizens, have opinions on political, social, and environmental issues
in their professional capacity, they must treat these decisions as part
of the background conditions against which they must make their
specific technical development decisions.
The sharp distinction that the traditional view draws between
economic development and social, environmental, and political
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issues means that foreign technical development decision-makers can
assume that the country in which the project is located will make
these non-economic decisions for itself. The society, acting through
its political development decision-makers, will also decide how to
share the costs and benefits of the project among the various
stakeholders. Consequently, the foreign technical development
decision-makers can treat these decisions as background facts during
the project negotiations and as fixed variables in their own planning.
In the context of a specific project, the first responsibility of the
project or technical decision-makers-its sponsors. financiers, and
contractors-is to evaluate the project in terms of its technical,
financial, and economic feasibility. As long as they conclude that the
project is technically feasible-that its economic and financial
benefits exceed its economic and financial costs, and it will produce
the desired rate of return-they deem the project justified and
developmentally beneficial. 5
A similar division of labor and authority exists between the
political decision-makers and the technical decision-makers in the
creation of a specific development policy. The political decisionmakers are responsible for making decisions about the political
issues, including the social and environmental aspects of the policy.
The technical decision-makers have two tasks. They must provide
the political leadership with the technical information to make
informed political decisions and determine how to turn these political
decisions into technically workable policies.
Democracy, in this view, is limited to the political process. The
democratic political process will hold the leadership of the society
accountable for the way in which they make decisions about the
social and environmental impacts of development policies and
projects. The technical development decision-makers-those who
implement their own policies or projects or those of the political
leadership-are responsible for acting in compliance with the
political and legal framework established by the political leadership,
and ensuring the technical and financial feasibility of their actions
BAUM & STOKES A. TOLBERT, INVESTING IN
(2d ed. 1985) (presenting an overview and analysis of the World
Bank's development investment process).

5. See generally WARREN C.

DEVELOPMENT
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and decisions. In the normal course of events, society cannot hold
them accountable through the political process for their decisions and
actions.6
The proponents of the traditional view do not believe that
technical development decision-making requires broad consultation.
To the extent that technical development decision-makers feel the
need to consult with others before making any particular
development decision, the range of people with whom they need to
consult is limited. Since they are responsible exclusively for
technical and financial issues, they need to consult only with other
technical and financial experts before making their decisions. In fact,
proponents of this view tend to be skeptical about the contribution
that the public can make to a technical discussion of the project.
Consequently, they usually do not value public participation in
technical decision-making very highly.
It follows that these proponents also believe that society has a
limited need for technical development decision-makers to share
information with anyone outside the group of experts participating in
the relevant decision. Furthermore, proponents of this view argue
that too much sharing of information or consultation is inefficient
because it slows down decision-making and increases costs.
The traditional view's proponents' understanding of accountability
strengthens their inherent tendency towards restricting participation
and disclosure of information. They argue that there are three levels
of' accountability. The first is legal liability. Technical decisionmakers will only be accountable to the project's intended
beneficiaries and to those adversely affected by the project in two
situations. The first is when they have a direct contractual
relationship with these other stakeholders and have failed to perform
their contractual obligations. The second is when they have
committed a tort against these other stakeholders and a forum is
willing to entertain the victim's claim. This forum could be either a
national or an international court or tribunal.

6. This does not mean that the technical decision-makers cannot be held
accountable by other means. See infra pp. 1553-55 (discussing the responsibilities
of technical decision-makers).
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The second level of accountability belongs to those who "made"
them development decision-makers. This means that shareholders
hold corporate actors accountable for their actions." Similarly, the
member states collectively hold international organizations
accountable.
Under this view of accountability, political development decisionmakers are accountable through the process of democratic
governance to their electorate. However, this form of government
accountability has limits. The electorate only has an opportunity to
periodically state its preference on who should govern them. In these
elections, they must base their choices on all the decisions that the
government has made. Consequently, as a general rule, they are more
likely to hold governments accountable for their overall performance
than they are for any one particular development decision. This
suggests that elections are not particularly well-suited vehicles for
holding governments accountable for each specific development
decision they make. Interested private actors can also challenge
governments through existing administrative or judicial procedures.
The third level of accountability is that the state may hold nonstate decision-makers responsible for the way in which they
complied with the applicable regulatory framework. This level of
accountability depends on the judicial and administrative forums
available in the relevant jurisdiction.
The traditional view of development decision-making is consistent
with the conventional view of sovereignty. By treating social,
political, and environmental factors as externalities in technical
development decision-making, the traditional view implicitly defines
the scope of the state's sovereignty with regard to other actors in
development decision-making. It allocates decision-making about the
social, political, and environmental factors to the sovereign and
makes all other actors defer to the sovereign's decisions on these
issues. However, in regard to economic and technical development
decisions, other decision-makers do not necessarily have to defer to
7. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER. LA\V S OF CORPORATIONS
717-43 (3d ed. 1983) (describing the management structure of corporations and
noting that the board of directors' primary obligation is to the corporation's
shareholders).
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the sovereign's preferences. 8 The result is that, for example, states
expect private investors to respect and comply with the sovereign's
decisions about national environmental law and policy, but the
investors do not necessarily have to comply with the sovereign's
decisions about where they should invest their money. This is
consistent with the legal rule that a foreign project sponsor or
contractor must obey the law of the host state and refrain from
interfering in the affairs of the host state.9
It should be noted that the traditional view contemplates two rather
limited roles for non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") in
development. The first is that NGOs can help lobby the government
to adopt certain policies dealing with the social, political, cultural
and environmental aspects of development. The second is that they
can assist project victims in holding project decision-makers
accountable for their decisions and actions. Their efficacy in doing
so will depend, in the first instance, on how much access they have
to local judicial and administrative tribunals and to the media. They
may also hold decision-makers accountable through international
forums and through developing international campaigns in
conjunction with international NGOs.10 According to this view, only
technical NGOs may be able to play a direct role in decision-making
for development.
Finally, the traditional view places some constraints on the topics
that are open for negotiation in any development transaction. Since
8. A number of official documents reflect this view. See, e.g., WORLD BANK,
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT art. IV, § 10 (amended Feb. 16, 1989), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/art4.htm ("The Bank and its
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members
concerned.") (last visited June 16, 2001); see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 250-55 (Philip Collidge et al. eds., 1977) (outlining the components
of cooperative relationships between multinational enterprises and the countries in
which they operate).
COOPERATION AND

9. See generally M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT (1994).

10. See infra pp. 1544-45 (discussing these international forums and the
growing ability of stakeholders to internationalize their concerns).
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the broad social, political, and environmental decisions are the
prerogative of the government, they are outside the scope of the
negotiations between the project sponsor and the government or the
project sponsor and the contractors. In both sets of negotiations, the
parties must treat the broad social, environmental, and political
parameters of the project as fixed and negotiate the terms of their
transaction within these parameters.
B. THE MODERN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING

1. The Three Stinmulifor the Modern Viiew
The modem view of decision-making for development is a
response to three developments in human affairs. The first is our
growing recognition that the environment has a limited capacity to
maintain the human societies that we have created." There is
mounting empirical evidence supporting this realization and in too
many cases project sponsors have so underestimated project costs
and overestimated project benefits that they have mistakenly
constructed, and continue to construct, developmentally harmful
2
projects.1
One consequence of this insight is that the world community is
attaching increasing importance to the assessment of all the
environmental impacts associated with human activity. As a result,
many project stakeholders are demanding that project sponsors
11. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., Introduction to INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY at v-vi (David Hunter et al. eds., 1998) (noting
that "human economic activity threatens to surpass the ecological limits of the
biosphere (if it has not already done so in certain instances)").
12. See, e.g., BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT (1994)

(analyzing the World Bank's often destructive environmental and political impact
on millions of people); see also BRADFORD MORSE & THOMAS R. BERGER, THE
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW: SARDAR SAROVAR (1992) (describing how

Sardar Sarovar projects, which faced resistance from tribal peoples living in the
project area, have adversely effected these peoples, including families being
physically removed from their land); RAYMOND F. MIKESELL & LARRY WILLIAMS,
INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992) (discussing several case

studies in which poor assessments of projects costs have resulted in excessive
environmental costs). See also WCD REPORT, supra note I. at 39-40, 97-100.
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account for all the expected human and physical environmental costs
and benefits of their proposed projects before they can proceed with
the project. The modem view seeks to place the responsibility for
assessing these impacts on the party who is undertaking the action
that will cause them. It also seeks to hold this party responsible for
any adverse impacts actually caused by the action. The operational
expressions of these demands are the importance project stakeholders
attach to impact assessments in project planning and the growing
acceptance of the precautionary principle. 3 It has also resulted in
stakeholders paying more careful attention to identifying the party
responsible for assessing the environmental consequences of the
proposed activity. This is a significant change from the traditional
view, which assigned this responsibility to the sovereign and allowed
all other actors to defer to the sovereign's decision in this regard.
The second development is the increasing influence of
international human rights law and forums around the world. The
development of international human rights law has educated
governments
and international
organizations
about their
responsibilities towards those whom their actions affect. It has also
raised awareness among people about their rights and increased their
willingness to take steps to oppose development projects that they
believe will harm them. The existence of international mechanisms
for raising human rights claims means that many of those adversely
affected by development projects may now challenge these projects
in an international forum where they can obtain an "on the record"

13. See, e.g., UN/ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a

Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, UN-ECE, 30 I.L.M. 802 [hereinafter
Espoo Convention] (not yet in force as of Nov. 25, 1999); see also HUNTER ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 360 (defining the precautionary principle, which evolved from
the recognition that scientific certainty comes too late to design effective legal and

policy responses for preventing environmental threats). The principle shifts the
burden of scientific proof necessary for triggering policy responses from those

whose support prohibiting a harmful activity to those who want to continue the
activity. See HUNTER ET. AL, supra note 11, at 366 (describing environmental

impact assessment ("EIA") as the "process for examining, analyzing and assessing
proposed activities, policies or programs to integrate environmental issues into
development planning and maximize the potential for environmentally sound and
sustainable development").
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hearing. 4 This makes it feasible for the adversely affected people to
seek to hold accountable those who actually harmed them. For
example, people who feel that they have suffered material harm
because the World Bank has not followed its own operating rules and
procedures can file a "Request for Inspection" with the World
Bank's Inspection Panel. 5 Similarly, groups who feel that
development projects are violating their human rights may be able to
file claims before bodies such as the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission. 6 In addition, some domestic courts in the project
sponsor's or contractor's home state have been willing to consider
these cases.17 Regardless of the outcome of the proceedings in these
forums, the mere fact that people have filed these cases can damage
the reputations and financial positions of the project sponsors,
contractors and the government, who approved the project. These
increased costs can be enough to change the calculus of the project's
relative costs and benefits. The result is that, in addition to public
interest groups, some in the corporate sector are calling for all the
key actors in the project to take more account of human rights
considerations in their project planning and implementation.
14. See Richard B. Bilder, An Oier'iewof Internationaltlunan Rights Last, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3. 11-14 (Hurst Hannum, ed., 3d ed.

1999) (describing the methods by which international human rights obligations can
be enforced).
15. See Daniel Bradlow, InternationalOrganizationsand Private ('omplnnts
The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1994); see
also IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN
PRACTICE (2000). See also World Bank Inspection Panel, The Chad-Cameroon
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (modified Mar. 22, 20I1, at
http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf/WRequest 48D29E3AE8970CDE
85256A410070A5AB (last visited June 16, 2001 ).
16. See INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION
oN
Hi %t
-N
RIGHTS, at
http://www.iachr.org (last visited June 16, 2001) (explaining the process that
allows persons and groups to petition the Commission for an investigation of
violations of rights protected by the American Convention on Human Rights,
adopted in 1969).
17. See, e.g. Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing residents of
Ecuador to file suit against Texaco in New York for environmental and personal
injuries). See also Adams i% Cape Indus.. Plc., 1989 WNL 651250 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 27, 1989) (involving South African employees of the defendants who filed
suit in England when they were exposed to asbestos during their employment in
South Africa).
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The third development is the impact of technology on
development
projects.
The
dramatic
developments
in
telecommunications and information technology have helped to
globalize financial markets. They have also accelerated the flow of
information around the world so that it is now possible for people in
one place to learn within seconds about developments on the other
side of the world. One consequence is that many more financial
institutions and multinational companies are able to compete for
contracts associated with the development projects being sponsored
by governments and private entities around the world. Another is that
opponents of any development project, in principle, are able to
mobilize support for their cause around the globe. The result is that
all large development projects are now internationalized in the sense
that foreign companies are likely to participate in them. In addition,
international NGOs as well as local organizations may campaign for
or against them.
The involvement of the NGOs not only may cause delays and
change the cost calculations for the project, but it tends to
internationalize the regulatory framework applicable to the project.
The reason is that these groups do not necessarily see any reason to
defer to national regulatory and legal standards in developing their
positions on a particular project, even though these might be the only
applicable binding standards. In fact, they are likely to demand that
the project satisfy higher standards if they are aware that other
countries' laws, regulations, international agreements, guidelines, or
industry best practices establish higher standards for the relevant
aspects of the project than do the applicable national regulations.
This internationalization of regulatory frameworks means that
prudent development decision-makers need to be aware of all
potentially applicable standards, regardless of whether the
government in the relevant state has established its own standards
and has its own laws and regulations on the subject. They will also
have to determine how to apply these various standards and rules to
their projects and their decision-making. If the decision-makers
ignore these standards or fail to conform to them, they run the risk of
being the target of an international campaign, being found "guilty" in
the court of public opinion, and suffering either damage to their
reputation or unexpected increases in their project costs. The
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challenge, however, is that there is not necessarily any consensus on
how to interpret and apply all these potentially relevant standards.
2. The Modern View
The proponents of the modem view see development as an
economically, politically, socially, culturally, and environmentally
integrated process. They argue that everyone involved in
development projects must see them not as discrete events but as
episodes of economic, environmental, and social transformation.
This suggests that the primary interest of the proponents of the
modem view is ensuring an optimal process for reaching decisions
about managing this transformation. They are relatively less
concerned with the specific outputs of development decision-making
than are the proponents of the traditional view.
This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that they are not
interested in the outputs of development. Instead, it should be
understood as meaning that their first concern is ensuring that the
choice of outputs is a reflection of the priorities and decisions of all
the relevant stakeholders as determined through the optimal decisionmaking process. In addition, they want to ensure that the outputs
meet the appropriate social, environmental, cultural, technical,
economic, political, and financial standards.
According to this view, the desirability of a particular activity
depends on the way in which the activity will affect the social and
physical environment in which it takes place and how these impacts
will evolve over the life cycle of the activity. This means that to fully
assess the desirability of a particular project proposal it is necessary
to account for all its impacts over the life cycle of the project.
Without all this information, the decision-makers cannot be
confident that they understand the economic,
financial,
environmental, social, cultural, and political consequences of their
decisions. They also cannot accurately measure all the costs and
benefits of the project, thereby increasing the risk that they will
approve projects that may cause injuries to the social and physical
environment that they did not anticipate in their planning. The result
may be outputs-projects or policies-that are less beneficial than
anticipated and more harmful than expected.
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A number of consequences follow from this view of development.
The first is that development decision-makers have greater and more
complex responsibilities than proponents of the traditional view
assigned to them. According to the traditional view, development
decision-makers are only responsible for the performance of their
specific project related functions. Under the modem view, they are
responsible for both the performance of their specific project
functions and for the impact of these functions on the other
stakeholders in the project and on the physical and human
environment. This suggests that development decision-makers may
no longer acceptably treat social and environmental costs as
externalities that are the responsibility of the sovereign. All
stakeholders now expect them to internalize these costs and account
for them in their project planning. In other words, it is not
responsible, in an economic or risk management sense, for
development decision-makers to rely on government decisions
relating to environmental and social matters.
The modem view blurs the distinction that the traditional view
drew between technical and political development decision-makers.
According to the modern view, all technical development decisionmakers must pay careful attention to the social, political, cultural,
and environmental impacts of their decisions. They can no longer
assume that they may prudently defer to the political decisionmakers on these issues. Consequently, the modern view requires all
development decision-makers to become proficient technical and
political decision-makers.
The second consequence, which follows from the first, is that
proponents of this view of development attach great importance to
consultations between development decision-makers and all those
who their proposed decision, action, or project will affect. For
example, project development decision-makers can only be confident
that they have accurately assessed the costs and benefits of the
proposed project if they understand how all the project-affected
people will react to the resulting changes in their social and physical
environment. Project developers can only uncover this information
through consultation with all those parties that the project will affect
or with those who have the ability to influence how these affected
parties will respond to the project.
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The emphasis on consultations has two important implications.
First, the consultation process can only give project sponsors and
contractors the desired result if the project decision-makers provide
the affected people with adequate information about the project.
Unless these people have sufficient information on the project to
understand its potential impacts, the developers cannot know with
any confidence how the affected people will respond. The need for
consultation, therefore, necessarily leads to a requirement for
disclosure of information.1S
The requirements for consultation and disclosure of information
raise the difficult issue of the appropriate timing for these actions. If
they take place too late in the decision-making process, the range of
issues that the parties can usefully discuss and the types of changes
that project managers will make are limited. This is because the
project sponsors have invested too much time and too many
resources in the project to be willing to consider significant changes.
Consequently, the stakeholders are likely to view consultations that
take place too late in the decision-making process as insufficient and
the risk of conflict is thereby increased. They are also likely to be
dissatisfied with consultations that end before they are able to fully
assess the actual impact of the proposed activity on their lives. This
suggests that consultations and information disclosure needs to begin
as early as possible, ideally during the needs assessment phase, and
continue throughout the life cycle of the proposed activity.
The need for consultations also has the effect of partially
localizing the focus of the proposed activity." This follows from the
need for the development decision-makers to pay greater attention to
18. See generally, e.g., ROBERT L. SCHIFFMAN & MARK S. SQUILLAC ,
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING: NEPA AND THE END,,NGLRED SPI- .IES ACT

(3d ed. 2000) (examining the integration of the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") into the study of assessmentbased decision-making).
19. Note this is taking place at the same time as the regulator) frame%%ork for
projects is being globalized. See supra p. 1544 (discussing globalization of

regulatory frameworks). See generally Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlo%%,
Are We Being PropelledTowards a People-Centered Transntional Legal Order.,
9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1993) (discussing the development of

international organizations and standards and the erosion of the concept of absolute
sovereignty of individual nations).
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local concerns and impacts, even if the project's ultimate rationale is
to provide national or even transnational benefits. This necessarily
has the effect of empowering local stakeholders and their
representatives in their consultations with the project decisionmakers. In this regard, it is important to note that the modem view
highlights the importance of consulting groups traditionally excluded
from power, such as women and indigenous people. Since these
groups have the ability to influence the future impacts of the activity
and its likely success, project sponsors cannot ignore them in the
consultation process.
Local and national governments will need to pay careful attention
to removing legal barriers that might impair the ability of these
groups to participate in the consultation process. These barriers could
include both overtly discriminatory laws and legal measures that
have the effect of inhibiting these groups from participating in the
consultations. Clearly, these legal reforms may have benefits for all
stakeholders in the proposed activity.
Another implication is that consultations necessarily politicize all
development activity because both the disclosure of information and
the actual consultations become part of the efforts of the sponsor of
the activity to secure the affected stakeholders' support for the
activity. If the affected people do not support the activity, the
development decision-makers cannot be confident that they will act
in their best interests. They also cannot be certain that the proposed
activity will be sufficiently sustainable to actually produce the
expected benefits, or that it will have the predicted impacts.
Consequently, the consultations become an important arena of
contest between those who support and those who oppose the
activity.
Interestingly, the politicization of the project also affects the issue
of disclosure of information. The sponsors feel that if they disclose
information before they have fully developed their plans and
responses to all likely concerns they may undermine public support
for the activity and, therefore, its success. The activity's opponents,
on the other hand, argue that the failure to disclose information very
early in the planning process unfairly biases the consultation process
in favor of the activity.
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Projects can also be politicized in another way. This occurs in
cases where the local stakeholders and the relevant governmental
authorities have differences of opinion over the desirability of the
activity. In this case, the other development decision-makers will
need to make a choice as to how to respond to these differences in
opinions. This clearly forces foreign development decision-makerscontractors, financiers-to take a position on a domestic political
issue.
Another complication that affects the consultation process is that it
is unclear who should be invited to participate. To the frustration of
development decision-makers, this is, to a significant extent, a
question of self-definition. Those who believe the proposed activity
will affect them and those that can demonstrate that they represent
interests that the activity will affect should be included in the
consultation process. The failure to include all these people exposes
the proposed project or activity to the risks of disruption and
unanticipated increases in costs caused by those groups who believe
that they have been unfairly excluded from the consultations. This
means that the development decision-makers need to ensure that they
include weaker stakeholders in the consultations. Weaker
stakeholders may not have the ability to effectively protest their
exclusion from the consultations, but their actions can influence the
success of the project. Good examples of this latter group of
stakeholders are women, indigenous people, and other minority
groups.
The politicization of projects also has an important effect on the
skills that the development decision-makers, including international
organizations, demand of their management and staff. It is no longer
sufficient for the management and staff to be technically proficient.
They must also have an understanding of the social, cultural,
political, and economic dynamics of the communities that their
activities will affect. In addition, they should learn how to encourage
the people in these communities to participate in the impact
assessment exercises that they undertake as part of their planning
process. This requires them to learn how to persuade these people to
support their projects and to bear the costs that these projects may
impose on them. Thus, they need to begin developing much better
political skills than they have previously viewed as necessary. It is no
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longer sufficient for them to know how to lobby governments and
other key decision-makers; they now must be able to practice the
kind of politics that appeal to ordinary people.
The modem view of development clearly requires a more
participatory form of decision-making than the traditional view. The
reason is that without people feeling that they are able to influence
the decision-making process, they are unlikely to have confidence in
and be willing to take part in the consultation process. This in turn
means that development decision-makers who insist on a top-down
form of decision-making are unlikely to obtain all the information
they need to anticipate and assess all project impacts.2 0
The modem view of development favors the bottom-up style of
decision-making, which not only demands organizational change
from development decision-makers but also requires a redefinition of
efficiency in project planning and execution. Project sponsors can no
longer calculate efficiency purely in terms of the time taken for
decision-making and financial costs. Now, they must recognize that
slower decision-making can be more efficient if it produces greater
consensus and more sustainable projects. More expensive planning
costs can be justified if they lead to reduced expenses over the life of
the project. This is a significant distinction from the traditional view
and it suggests that the modem view may not be fully compatible
with the traditional financial accounting practices, based on
discounting all costs and benefits to net present value, which project
planners currently use.
The need for consultation in project decision-making highlights
another characteristic of the modem view, which is that it impacts on
our perception of democracy. It requires us to draw a distinction
between democratic governance and democratic decision-making.
Democratic governance refers to the participatory way in which
societies choose their leaders and hold them accountable. In this
selection process, people base their choice on how they expect their
leaders to govern the entire society and manage all the issues and
20. See, e.g. OPERATIONS POL'Y DEP'T, WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND

PARTICIPATION 5 (1994) (indicating that greater transparency, accountability,
improved institutional performance, and enhanced information flows are some of
the potential benefits of increased stakeholder participation).
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challenges that it may face over the whole period between elections.
Democratic decision-making, on the other hand, refers to the way
in which decisions relating to each policy, project or program that
directly affects people and the social and physical environment in
which they live is made. Thus, democratic decision-making deals
with the way in which individual policy, program, and project
decisions are made in both the public and private sectors. It places a
high premium on participatory decision-making, transparency in
decision-making and holding those who have decision-making
authority accountable for their decisions. The modem view of
development, while not diminishing the importance of democratic
governance, places great emphasis on democratic decision-making.
It is possible for a society that has all the features of democratic
governance to have a minimal number of the features of democratic
decision-making. The modem view of development decision-making
brings this characteristic of a society into sharp focus and creates
pressures for more democratic decision-making.
A third consequence of the modem view is that it has begun to
blur the boundaries of the scope of development decision-makers'
responsibility. Under the traditional view, the scope of their
responsibilities is relatively well defined. In the context of a specific
project, their responsibilities are limited to the discrete location of
the project and, more specifically, to those aspects of the project for
which they had direct responsibility. Furthermore, their
responsibilities have relatively clear temporal boundaries. For
example, the project sponsors and contractors are responsible for
events that happen during the time they are working on the project
site and for problems that develop directly out of their work for a
defined period thereafter.2' Their responsibilities will only be
ongoing if they continue to be involved in the operation and
maintenance of the project after construction is completed.
In the modem view, on the other hand, since all aspects of the
project are seen as intertwined, the sponsors and contractors cannot

21. The time period for which the project sponsors and contractors remain
liable for damage may be set by contractual warranties. by statute, or may depend
on their continuing relationship with the project.
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easily divide responsibility amongst themselves. This makes it harder
to identify the limits of the responsibility of each development
decision-maker. In addition, the modem perception of a project
requires project decision-makers to account for all impacts over the
entire life cycle of the project. This means that, in principle, their
responsibility will also extend over the entire life cycle of the project
and for the period thereafter in which the project's impacts are still
socially or environmentally significant. In fact, under the modern
vision of development, any attempt to draw boundaries around the
development decision-makers' responsibilities is a question of
judgement and requires debate and consultation.
The significance of the difference in perceptions of responsibility
between the two views can be seen in the case of a dam. Under the
traditional view of development, the scope of any particular technical
development decision-maker's responsibility is limited to its direct
contributions to the dam itself and its immediately surrounding areas.
The duration of its responsibilities is limited to the time of its actual
involvement in the dam project and for a defined period thereafter.
On the other hand, the modem view would hold the development
decision-makers at least partly responsible for the dam's social,
economic, cultural, political, and environmental impacts on the
whole river basin. Moreover, it would hold them responsible for its
effect on all those who depend on the river basin and for how these
will evolve over the period of the dam's construction, operation and
decommissioning. Its responsibility would also continue during the
period in which the environment and the affected people adapt to the
decommissioning of the dam.
The changing view of development decision-maker responsibility
has legal significance. It used to be the case that both local and
foreign businesses could feel relatively confident that they had met
all their legal obligations if they acted in conformity with the
national law of their host countries. However, the changing scope of
their responsibilities begins to call this into question. First, as the
example of the dam project suggests, the project may have impacts
outside the borders of the state in which the project is located that
each of the relevant development decision-makers must incorporate
into its planning. Thus they will need to pay attention to the
international and national law that may be applicable to these "extra-
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territorial" effects.
In addition, as was discussed above, it may not be sufficient for
decision-makers to be complacent if the host state law does not
adequately deal with particular issues. They now must take into
account the possibility that the adversely affected people can claim,
either in a legal forum or in the "court" of public opinion, that the
particular decision-maker is liable for their suffering. Those harmed
may argue that the decision-maker is responsible because it did not
follow the best practices in the industry or meet the highest
regulatory standards in the world. This argument can be a powerful
moral argument that has the potential to cause significant harm to the
reputation of the development decision-maker, although it may not
be a winning legal argument.
Consequently, prudent development decision-makers need to
consider whether the law of the state of the project conforms to the
best practices in the industry or regulatory standards in the world. In
cases where these legal requirements are found to be less than best
practices, the project decision-maker must decide whether to comply
with the higher non-national and even non-binding regulatory
standards even though they are not applicable under local law.
Another legal consequence is that the modem view does not show
the same respect for the concept of sovereignty as the traditional
view. Under the traditional view, the sovereign has the final decision
over the social, political, cultural, and environmental externalities in
development projects and policies. Under the modem view, these
externalities have been internalized and are now part of the
responsibility of each of the actors in the development project. This
means that there is no set of issues that is specifically reserved for
the sovereign's final decision. In fact, responsible development
decision-makers and other project stakeholders are expected to make
their own decisions about these "externalities" even if it places them
in conflict with the sovereign. According to the modem concept of
development, the sovereign is only one actor in the development
drama, and there is no clear justification for international
organizations, private corporations, financial institutions, and NGOs
to give its opinions greater weight than those of other actors in the
drama. In fact, the case for deferring to the sovereign's opinions is
weak when these opinions conflict with the expressed interests of
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those who will be most directly affected by the project.
The modem view of development, with its expanded vision of
development decision-maker responsibility, challenges the view that
a corporation's primary function is to maximize profits and produce
the largest possible return for its shareholders. This view of
development suggests that they have additional responsibilities to all
the stakeholders in the project and to all who will be affected by the
changes in the physical and social environment that their actions will
cause. Consequently, under this view, the primary function of
corporations is making the largest possible profit consistent with the
overall social and environmental sustainability of their activities and
the interests of all stakeholders. It is not merely to maximize either
short or long-term profits.22
The modem view also has implications for the rights of private
property owners. While the rights of property owners have never
been absolute and have always been subject to changing conceptions
of the public good, the modem view of development has the potential
to impose important new restrictions on private property owners. It
would impose on private property owners, who propose to use their
private property in any way which could impact on the rights of
others or their environment, the same obligations as it imposes on
other development decision-makers. Thus, in principle, these
property owners will need to consider all the ways in which their
actions will affect others. They will also be expected to share this
information with and consult with all those who may be affected by
their proposed action. Finally, they should arrive at a mutually
acceptable arrangement with these affected parties before proceeding
with their proposed use of their property.

22. This argument can be applied by analogy to international economic
organizations. Like corporations, they can no longer only be concerned with
producing benefits for their member states whose interests are expressed by their
government representatives. They must also be concerned with the interests of all
the stakeholders in their operations.
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II. THE COMPETING VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT
AND THE WCD
The descriptions of the traditional and modem views of
development suggest that, in general, opponents of dams, opponents
of other large development projects, and those who protest against
the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF all propound some version
of the modem vision of development decision-making. These
descriptions also suggest that, in general, the supporters of dams,
multinational corporations, international economic organizations,
and governments advocate a view of development decision-making
that is closer to the traditional vision. The similarities in the position
of the protagonists of the dams debate and the competing participants
in other debates about development projects and policies and about
governance suggest that the WCD report can offer some interesting
lessons for the broader debate about development decision-making.
The following description of the findings and proposals of the
WCD will clarify the relevance of the WCD Report to this broader
debate. It will be followed by a discussion of the lessons that the
WCD offers to the protagonists in the broader debate about
development decision-making.
A. THE WCD REPORT
The WCD's assignment was to study the issue of dams and to
recommend criteria, guidelines, and standards that could be used in
future proposed dam projects. The twelve member WCD, in order to
produce its report, developed a knowledge base that consisted ofeight dam case studies, country studies of India and China, a briefing
paper on Russia and the newly independent states, a cross-check
study of one hundred twnety-five dams, seventeen thematic reviews,
one hundred thirty technical papers, nine hundred forty-seven written
submissions, and four regional consultations in which fourteen
hundred people from fifty-nine countries participated.
1. The Findings qf the WCD
Today, there are approximately 45,000 large dams in 145
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countries. 23 Approximately 40,000 of these large dams were
constructed in the second half of the twentieth century. 4 About
eighty percent of these large dams are in five countries: China
(22,000), the United States (6,390), India (over 4,000), Spain and
Japan (1,000-1,200 each).25 While the rate of construction has
decreased, 1,700 large dams are currently under construction.2 6 This
means, given that the average construction period for a large dam is
5-10 years, between 160-320 new dams become operational each
year.27
These dams have profoundly impacted the world as "large dams
have fragmented and transformed ...rivers. 28 Forty-six percent of
the world's primary watersheds have at least one dam.2' Dams supply
water to thirty to forty percent of the two hundred sixty-eight million
hectare of irrigated land in the world and, as a consequence,
contribute to "at most" twelve to sixteen percent of world food
production.30 They produce nineteen percent of the world's
electricity supply.3 In about one-third of the world's countries,
however, hydropower generates over fifty percent of the available
electricity.3 2 About thirteen percent of all large dams play an
important role in managing floods, which affect the lives of more
23. See supra note 1 (providing a definition of "large dams").
24. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, fig. 1.5, at 8 (showing distribution of large
dams at end of 2 0 h century).

25. See id. at 9.
26. See id. at 10 (explaining that currently, the largest dam builders are India
(695 to 960 dams under construction), China (280), Turkey (209), South Korea
(132), and Japan (90)). The number of dams under construction in India is a matter
of debate and the number depends on the source consulted. See id.
27. See id. at 10 (discussing world average of dams constructed annually).
28. See id. at 15.
29. See id. (noting that the world has 106 primary watersheds).
30. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (analyzing the considerable variation
between countries). For example, dams account for 100 percent of irrigated land in
Egypt but only 1percent in Bangladesh and Nepal. See id.
31. See id. at 14 (stating that hydropower is used in over 150 countries).
32. See id. (expressing the fact that in 24 countries, over 90 percent of power is
provided by hydropower, and, in another 63 countries, over 50 percent of
electricity is provided by hydropower).
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people than any other type of disaster including war, drought, and
famine.

33

The WCD found that governments have often over-estimated the
benefits that these dams would produce, while simultaneously
underestimating the costs. 34 This is due both to poor estimations of
costs and benefits and to the failure to incorporate all the costs into
the planning of the project. Most significantly, project planners have
tended to pay inadequate attention to the social and environmental
costs associated with dams.
The social costs of dams have nevertheless been substantial. Dams
have displaced people, disrupted the lives of the communities into
which the displaced people have moved, and deprived riverine
communities, particularly those downstream from dams of their
livelihoods.3" In some cases, the reservoirs or rivers transformed by
dams have deprived whole societies of their access to natural
resources and of their cultural heritages.36
No one is sure how many people dam projects have adversely
affected. However, experts have estimated that the construction of
large dams has displaced between forty to eighty million people
worldwide. 37 This estimate only refers to those whom dams have
displaced directly. It does not include people displaced by other
aspects of dam projects such as canals, powerhouses, roads, and
compensatory measures such as biological reserves." Commonly, the
33. See id. at 14-15 (revealing that floods affected the lives of 65 million
people between 1972-1996, and that during this period. an estimated 3.3 million
people were left homeless each year by floods).
34. See id. at 37-71(examining
performance of large dams).

the technical, financial,

and economic

35. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1. at 16 (evaluating the negative impacts of
large dams on populations).
36. See id. (describing the losses caused by dams).
37. See id. at 104 (analyzing the level of global displacement). Experts estimate
that between 1986-1993, an average of 300 dams starting construction each year
displaced four million people annually. See id. at 17 (citing WORLD BANK,
RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE BANK\VIDE
INVOLVING INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT 77 (1996)).

REVIEW

OF PROJECTS

38. See id. at 104 (noting the limitations of the figures, and emphasizing that
the figures only refer to physical displacement).
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definition of "affected persons" governments have used in
determining who to compensate excludes downstream communities
and landless and indigenous people.39 The result is that often only
those with legal title to land receive compensation. Consequently,
many adversely affected people have not been adequately
compensated for their losses.
Dams have also involved significant environmental costs. For
example, dams are the main physical threat to riverine ecosystems.4 °
The reason is that dams fragment the river thereby transforming both
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems .4 This has contributed to the
extinction or endangerment of at least twenty percent of all fresh
water fish species in recent years. 4 This, in turn, has adverse
consequences for the one billion people for whom fish is a critical
source of protein. 41 The fragmented rivers also impair the ability of
watersheds to perform their many ecosystem functions, including
nutrient recycling, water purification, soil replenishment, and flood
control. It has also adversely impacted estuaries leading to loss of
mangrove swamps, wetlands, and salt intrusion.44 Interestingly, the
WCD found that dams, because of the rotting vegetation left in their
reservoirs, are net emitters of greenhouse gases, thereby challenging
the conventional wisdom that dams are a clean source of energy.4 The financial costs of dams are also significant. Economists
estimate that the world has invested two trillion United States dollars
39. See id. at 105 (stating that WCD case studies show that communities
situated downstream from the dam, those without land or legal title, indigenous
people, and those affected by project infrastructure were not considered as affected
people at the time of the dam design and so were not included in any planned
compensation schemes).
40. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (citing dams as one of the many
factors leading to the degradation of ecosystems).
41. See id. (noting that the ecosystems are transformed with a range of effects
varying in duration and degree of reversibility).
42. See id. at 16 (noting that the world has over 9,000 fresh water fish).
43. See id. (stating that 40 percent of the world's fish inhabit watersheds).
44. See id. (noting that ecosystem transformations also close the mouths of
major rivers).
45. See id. at 75 (estimating that emissions from reservoirs may account for I28 percent of greenhouse gases).
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in large dams. 4 6 During the 1990s, the world spent approximately
thirty-two to forty-six billion United States dollars annually on large
dams, eight percent of which was spent by developing countries'"
The public sector directly financed about eighty percent of the
twenty-two to thirty billion dollars spent annually in developing
countries.48 The WCD found that many dams have not met their
financial and economic projections."
2. The WCD's Proposal:A New Framework./brDecision-Malking
The WCD proposes a new framework for decision-making about
water and energy management that is based on the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United
Nations Declaration on the Right to Development and the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development.'" The first two
documents establish the principle that all human beings have human
rights by virtue of their humanity and that any policy or law "must
contain the intention to respect the rights and entitlements of all."'"
These two documents, together with the Declaration on the Right to
Development, establish the indivisibility of civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights. A rights based approach to development
therefore includes "rights to life, health care, education, shelter, food,
water, remedy, security, subsistence, and livelihood" 2 as well as
rights of free speech and association, due process, religion, and
culture.5 3 These documents also place on each state the responsibility
to use its legal system and legislative process to give expression to
46. See WCD

REPORT,

supra note 1,at II (explaining that dams are promoted

as an important means of satisfying water and energy needs).
47. See id. (estimating annual large dam expenditures).
48. See id. at 11 (describing the public sector's imestment in dams in
developing countries).
49. See id. at 39-42 (stating that the average cost o- errun of dam projects
surveyed was 56 percent).
50. See id. at 197-211 (discussing the foundations of the globally accepted
framework for establishing universal goals and norms).
51. See id. at 200.
52. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1.at 200
53. See id. (noting the expression of rights and entitlements in law).
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and establish institutional mechanisms for upholding these rights.
Therefore, the WCD argues that, "a rights based approach..
provides a principled basis for mediating development choices
among competing interests. 54
The Rio principles, while recognizing the right to development,
insist that it must be met in a way that equitably balances the rights
of both the present and future generations.5 - Principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration imposes on all human beings the obligation to involve
themselves in environmental issues and to participate in decisions
relating to the environment.5 6 Principle 22 elaborates on this by
recognizing the vital role of indigenous people and other local
communities in environmental management and development. 7
The WCD uses these documents to develop a decision-making
framework based on the following five "core values and shared
understandings:" equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making,
sustainability and accountability.58 Based on these principles, it
derives a principle for decision-making that aims to assess both the
rights affected by the proposed decision and the associated risks it
creates. Its approach assumes that no party's rights will extinguish
any other party's rights and that, where different people's rights
come into conflict or competition, "negotiations conducted in good
faith offer the only process through which various interests can be
legitimately reconciled. '59 These negotiations should take place
"within a legal and procedural framework, including arbitration,
recourse and appeal mechanisms to ensure equitable adjudication in
cases where negotiated settlements are not achievable or are
54. See id.
55. See Report of U.N. Conf on Environment and Development: Rio
Declarationon Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., Annex I,
Agenda Item 21, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. I) (1992) (declaring how
the right to development must be fulfilled).
56. See id. at 10 (declaring that each person shall have access to environmental
information and the opportunity to be a part of the decision-making process).
57. See id. at 12 (declaring that indigenous people and local communities have
a vital role due to their knowledge and customs, and that the state should
encourage their participation).
58. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 202.
59. See id. at 206.
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contested."6
The WCD offers seven strategic priorities and policy principles to
effectuate its assessing rights and risk approach to negotiated
decision-making. The WCD has twenty-six guidelines that further
develop these seven strategic priorities. These strategic priorities and
guidelines together help define a participatory decision-making
process for both water and energy policy making and project design,
implementation and operation.
The seven strategic priorities are:
GAINING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE: First, this requires a process for
identifying the stakeholders in each decision, policy or project that is
based on "recognizing rights, addressing risks, and safeguarding the
entitlements of all groups of affected people, particularly indigenous
and tribal peoples, women and other vulnerable groups."'" Second, it
requires decision-making procedures that allow for informed
participation by all stakeholders in the decision and that result in
demonstrated public acceptance of key decisions." This means that
all stakeholders must negotiate key decisions regarding water and
energy resources. This includes the need for the prior, informed
consent of indigenous peoples for all actions that affect their
interests.63
COMPREHENSIVE OPTIONS ASSESSMENT: First, this means that
governments and international development organizations must base
the choice of water and energy policy and project options on a
"comprehensive and participatory assessment of the full range of
[available] policy, institutional, and technical options."' Thus,
governments and development organizations should undertake
60. See id. at 206-7.
61. See id. at 215.
62. See id. (describing the kinds of decision-making processes and mechanisms
utilized).
63. See I.L.O. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, art. 16, 28 I.LM. 1382, 1387-88 (stating
that where informed consent is not possible, appropriate procedures established by
national law and regulation, providing the opportunity for representation of those
concerned apply).
64. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 221.
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impact studies at both a strategic level before making water and
energy policy and at the project level. Second, this means that the
impact studies must address environmental, social, health, and
cultural heritage issues. Third, "in the assessment process, social and
environmental aspects [must] have the same significance as
economic and financial factors. 65
ADDRESSING EXISTING DAMS: This priority recognizes that the

context within which dams operate can change. Changes take place
in priorities in water use, land use, technology, and policy. It
therefore imposes on societies the responsibility to review and, if
necessary, alter the operations of reservoirs to optimize the benefits
of existing dams. This includes ensuring that dam operating rules and
66
procedures adequately address all social and environmental issues.
The WCD premises this
priority on the importance of rivers and their watersheds to life and
the livelihood of local communities.67 It underscores the need for
decision-makers to prioritize the "avoidance of impacts, followed by
the minimization and mitigation of harm to the health and integrity
of ... river system[s]. ' ' 68 To do this, it is important that those
contemplating dam projects undertake baseline ecosystem surveys
before beginning the decision-making process.
SUSTAINING RIVERS AND LIVELIHOODS:

RECOGNIZING

ENTITLEMENTS

AND

SHARING

BENEFITS:

This

priority is intended to ensure that all stakeholders share in the
benefits of the project and that dam project sponsors not deprive
them of their entitlements. It requires governments or others
sponsoring a dam to identify all those whose rights the proposed
project affects and ensure that they are able to participate in the
planning, design, construction, and operation of the dam. In other
words, policy and project sponsors need to ensure that they
understand the risks to baseline social conditions before making any
decisions. Further, it requires that all people whose rights may be at
65. Id.
66. See

id.

at

225-233

(insisting

that

opportunities

to

improve

the

environmental and social performance of dams be taken).
67. See id. at 234 (referring to rivers and watersheds as "the biological engines
of the planet").
68. See id.
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risk are able to conclude mutually agreed and legally enforceable
mitigation, resettlement, and development entitlements with the other
relevant stakeholders in the project. Dam project sponsors must pay
particular attention in this regard to ensure that adversely affected
people are "first among the beneficiaries of the project. ' "
ENSURING COMPLIANCE: 70

Public confidence in the project will
only exist if governments, developers, regulators, and operators all
comply with their obligations. 7 This suggests that the plans for each
project should include a compliance plan. This plan should spell out
how those planning and building the dam will achieve compliance
and how the parties will enforce the compliance plan. Possible
mechanisms for ensuring compliance with all project related
commitments include independent review panels for social and
environmental matters, and performance bonds and trust funds to
support compliance with project related social and environmental
commitments.
SHARING RIVERS FOR PEACE,

DEVELOPMENT,

AND SECURITY:

Transboundary rivers can be a source of tension between countries.
This priority suggests that one way to overcome this problem is for
the affected states to shift their focus "from the narrow approach of
allocating a finite resource to the sharing of rivers and their
associated benefits. 72 This approach is also consistent with the
principles of equitable and reasonable use, no significant harm, and
the prior sharing of information that are embodied in recent
international water law instruments."'

69. See id. at 240.
70. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 244 (requiring commitments for the

planning, implementation, and operation of dams to be met).
71. See id.
72. Id. at 251.
73. See, e.g., Convention on Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses, Apr. 11, 1997, arts. 5-9, at 1997 WL 434401 (declaring that

watercourses shall be used to attain optimal utilization: States shall participate in
use and protection of watercourses; riparian states can make reasonable and
equitable use of international watercourses; appropriate measures shall be taken to
prevent significant harm to other watercourse States, and watercourse States shall
regularly exchange information on the condition of the watercourse); Helsinki
Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers. August 1966, ch. 2, at
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Combined, these principles offer a new approach to decisionmaking that is dramatically different from the traditional approach in
water and energy management. This new approach seeks to have
decisions regarding dams emerge from a bottom-up process as
opposed to the top-down process traditionally utilized in dam
building. It also seeks to treat dams holistically and to incorporate all
elements of the project within the decision-making process. The
traditional approach, on the other hand, seeks to limit decisionmaking criteria to technical, economic, and financial issues.
B. THE WCD's LESSONS FOR THE BROADER DEBATE ON
DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING

The WCD offers both procedural and substantive lessons to the
protagonists in the broader debate about development decisionmaking. These lessons are discussed below.
1. Procedural

The first lesson is drawn from the participatory way in which the
WCD was formed, gathered its information, and prepared its
recommendations. This participatory process offers a model that can
be used to try and resolve disputes over other complex issues such as
diverse as mining and natural resource projects, genetically modified
foods, and structural adjustment policies. The WCD approach begins
with inviting representatives of all relevant stakeholders to a meeting
to determine the mandate for a commission that is selected to be both
credible to all stakeholders and representative of them. The dam
project sponsors then invite the stakeholders to contribute to the
development of a detailed knowledge base. This knowledge base
provides the generally acceptable hard factual data that is necessary
for resolving key issues pertaining to the subject matter being
studied. A participatory approach to information gathering makes it
more likely that all participants in the dispute will treat the
commission's findings and recommendations with respect. This
appears to have occurred with the WCD report, which people,
http://www.intemational waterlaw.org/IntlDocs/HelsinkiRules.htm (listing the
factors to be considered in determining what is a reasonable and equitable use of

watercourses).

2001]

1565

DEVELOPMENT DECISION-A,1.4KLNG

groups, and institutions with widely divergent views have endorsed.' 4
Second, the WCD, whose ability to produce a consensus document
owes a great deal to its transparent and participatory decision-making
process, demonstrates the importance of democratic decisionmaking. In so doing, it implicitly highlights the problems in the
current top-down decision-making practices that most transnational
corporations, government agencies, and international organizations
like the WTO, World Bank, and IMF follow.
2. Substantive
The findings of the WCD convincingly demonstrate that by failing
to give equal attention to the social and environmental consequences
of their proposed actions, traditional dam decision-makers
systematically underestimate the social and environmental costs and
overestimate the benefit of their proposed decisions. Given the
universally recognized importance of these social and environmental
issues, this is convincing evidence that the traditional view is no
longer a viable approach to development decision-making in the case
of dams. It also suggests that any new approach to decision-making
will only be able to command universal respect if it accords social
and environmental factors the same weight it gives to technical and
financial factors. These findings are also applicable to development
decision-making for other types of policies and projects that are like
dams in the sense that they have significant social and environmental
impacts - for example, natural resource extraction projects, large
manufacturing ventures, physical infrastructure projects, and
international monetary and trade policies.
Second, the fact that the WCD was able to produce a consensus
report even though its members represented a broad spectrum of
opponents and proponents of dams, demonstrates that many key
elements of the modem view of development decision-making, at
least in principle, are acceptable to a wide spectrum of opinion.
74. See

WCD,

Reactions

to

the

Final

Report,

at

http://www.dams.org/reportL/reaction.htm (last visited June 6. 2001 ) (indicating that
international organizations such as the International Commission on Large Dams
and the International Rivers Network endorse the WCD report with varying
degrees of enthusiasm).
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These elements include the importance of information disclosure,
participatory decision-making, clear procedures for holding decisionmakers accountable, options assessments, and incorporation of social
and environmental factors into development decision-making with
the same status as technical and financial factors.
It is important to note that the WCD model is too new for us to
know if this agreement will extend to the implementation of the
recommendations. It is already clear that the implementation of the
WCD's proposed decision-making framework will be very difficult.
Some key actors, such as the World Bank, have refused to be bound
by the Report's recommendations, and others have argued that the
proposals are too time-consuming, expensive and unpredictable. In
fact, while progress is being made towards this goal,75 it is not clear
that anyone-governments, international organizations, contractors,
private financial institutions, or NGOs-knows how to effectively
implement the WCD's guidelines in all cases where they might be
applicable. There are very few examples of participatory decisionmaking processes for large projects or policies that leave all
participants feeling that project sponsors treated them fairly. One
positive example is the budget making process followed by the city
76
government in Porto Allegro, Brazil.

III. SOME KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUES ARISING
FROM THE WCD REPORT THAT ARE RELEVANT
TO THE DEBATE OVER DEVELOPMENT
DECISION-MAKING
The WCD Report was only intended to provide guidance. The
WCD did not design it to provide a comprehensive blueprint that

75. The experience of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline is particularly interesting in
this regard. See supra note 15. See also, e.g., I.F.C., INVESTING IN PEOPLE:
(2000).
76. See Naomi Klein, A Fetefor the End of the End of History: When Activists
Converged on Porto Alegre, Brazil, For the 'Counter-Davos,' Democracy was in,
While Corporations,Elitism, and U.S. Imperialism Were Out, NATION, Mar. 19,
2001, at 2001 WL 2132361 (noting that the city of Porto Alegre has become a
SUSTAINING COMMUNITIES THROUGH IMPROVED BUSINESS PRACTICES

showcase of participatory democracy around the world because the city
government gives residents a direct say in decisions about the municipal budget).
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governments and international development organizations could
immediately implement for decision-making in water and energy
management. Consequently, the report raises a number of important
issues that it does not seek to resolve. These unresolved issues are
relevant both to future debates over dams and to the broader debate
over development decision-making. Four of the most pertinent issues
are discussed below.
A. THE OLD DECISION-MAKING ORDER IS DYING, BUT THE NEW

ORDER ISHAVING A HARD TIME BEING BORN
The WCD Report eloquently demonstrates that the traditional
view of development decision-making is no longer a feasible basis
for decision-making. It makes clear that the costs of making
development decisions in isolation from their social, environmental,
political, and cultural implications are unacceptably high.
This suggests that the traditional approach to development
decision-making is no longer viable and that we are irrevocably
involved in a process of evolution from the traditional view to a new
approach to development decision-making. Consequently, we are
involved in a difficult debate to determine the standards and
procedures that will shape a new approach to development decisionmaking that is broadly acceptable to all interested parties. In this
transition period, it is extremely difficult to make important
development decisions without precipitating conflict leading to
unexpected costs, sub-optimal decisions, or the failure to act at all.
The current situation, however, is not only costly but it is
untenable. Too many people live in absolute poverty and lack access
to safe sources of running water, housing, primary health care, and
education; and our environment is under too much stress. These
problems must be addressed, which means that decisions about
development need to be made and implemented. Consequently, all
sides to the broader debate about development decision-making have
an interest in resolving the current impasse.
While the need to resolve the debate is clear, it is not so easily
achieved. Fortunately, the WCD gives us some guidance in this
regard. The WCD precedent suggests that success is more likely if
the parties agree to focus on discrete problems that can be studied
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through a multi-stakeholder, participatory process, managed by a
small group of technically proficient and politically skilled
independent experts. Based on this study, these experts can offer new
approaches to old problems. Hopefully, over time this case-by-case
approach will provide us with sufficient information and knowledge
to develop a more generally acceptable approach to development
decision-making.
B. IT'S GREAT TO KNOW THE IDEAL, BUT WHAT IS THE MINIMUM
ACCEPTABLE STANDARD?

The WCD's proposed new framework for decision-making has
achieved two important things. First, it demonstrates that it is
possible to design an operationally useful decision-making process,
consistent with the contention that the social, environmental,
cultural, and political aspects of development are so completely
intertwined with the economic aspects that decision-makers must
treat them holistically. Second, it indicates that it is possible for the
various different stakeholders in a contentious development debate to
agree on what principles should underlie a tenable approach to
development decision-making.
This suggests that the next task is the challenge of implementation.
The WCD's proposal, in fact, is a description of an ideal decisionmaking framework. It does not address many of the concrete
problems that decision-makers are likely to face in implementing this
proposal. For example, it does not discuss how decision-makers can
decide what is enough consultation, especially if there are some
recalcitrant stakeholders who refuse to compromise or to accept third
party dispute settlement. It also does not discuss how decisionmakers can know if they are allocating an acceptable proportion of
their budget and human resources to these consultations. The WCD
also does not give any guidance for determining what constitutes an
adequate budgetary allocation for either strategic or project level
options assessments, particularly in relation to the overall budget for
the proposed sector or project level activity.
This suggests that there is an urgent need to conduct research on
these issues and to empirically test different methods for
implementing the proposal. One of the most pressing issues is
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developing the minimum acceptable standards for development
decision-making. To put it another way: how much deviation from
the WCD ideal is acceptable, or what constitutes "substantial
compliance" with its guidelines and criteria'? These minimum
standards are needed to guide the empirical testing that must take
place if we are to learn how to make the WCD proposal operational.
They are also necessary to guide the transition process that must be
undertaken if we are to move from the current problematic state of
development decision-making to a decision-making process that will
lead to socially and environmentally sustainable development.
The WCD report seems to suggest that the "floor" in its approach
is that no acceptable decision-making process should allow projects
to take place if they would result in uncompensated losses to some
people or in the violation of other human rights.
C. WHAT ABOUT THE VICTIMS?
According to the WCD, dam construction has forced between
forty to eighty million people to resettle. This estimate does not
include those who have suffered losses because of dam related
structures, such as power houses, access roads or canals, nor those
who live upstream or downstream from the dam and have suffered
losses due to changes in the river flow. Many of these people have
never received appropriate compensation for the loss of their
property, livelihoods, or cultural heritage or for the environmental,
social, and health injuries they have suffered. In many cases, these
people are suffering on-going injuries. Currently, dams "in the
pipeline" threaten many others with similar injuries.
The WCD's new framework for decision-making implicitly
highlights the failure of past decision-makers to adequately protect
these people's rights in their development decisions. It also raises the
issue of whether those who decided to build dams owe these victims
compensation for the injuries they have suffered. The importance of
this issue is likely to grow as these people and their advocates learn
about the opportunities that are now available to protect their
interests. Similarly, the debate will grow as the victims of dam
projects realize that current dam project sponsors are providing those
adversely affected by new projects with greater compensation and
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more opportunities for protections than past decision-makers offered
or delivered. In fact, the demands from these victims for reparations
are already beginning.77
The case for compensating these victims is morally very strong.
However, it is legally problematic. In many cases, it is unclear who
exactly caused the injury and should be held legally liable. In other
cases, no obvious forum exists in which to bring the action. The
victims' advocates will need to conduct legal research to resolve
these issues so that the problem of compensating the victims in a fair
and balanced manner is fairly resolved. If this does not happen, it is
likely the issue will continue to grow as a political problem that
states, international financial institutions, and corporations may be
forced to address on an ad hoc basis.
The significance of this issue should not be underestimated. The
problems of victims of dams are conceptually the same as the
problems of people who have suffered injuries from other
infrastructure, mining and natural resource projects, and large
commercial ventures of all sorts. There is no reason to assume that
these victims will be any less determined to press their claims once
they see how their counterparts are treated under new decisionmaking frameworks.
D. How Do WE REFORM INSTITUTIONS?
We have seen that the modem version of development decisionmaking and the WCD approach are both based on participatory and
77. Demands have come from victims in Guatemala, Panama, and Chile. See
Chixoy Dam Affected People Seek Reparations IRN UPDATE (Int'l Rivers
Network,
Berkeley,
CA),
Mar.
14,
2001
at
http://www.im.org/dayofaction/2001/010314.chixoydoa.html
(reporting
that
victims in Guatemala are demanding reparations); Princeton Report on World
Bank: Chixoy Dam Rio Negro Massacres ReparationsCampaigns, DAM UPDATE
(Rights Action, Guatemala), Mar. 2, 2001, at http://www.rightsaction.org/urgent_com/c010301a.htm (reviewing conflicting claims against World Bank for human
rights violations in regard to the Chixoy Dam); see also Monti Aguirre, Indigenous
People Demand Reparationsfiom Panama, 16 WORLD RIVERS REV. 7 (2001)
(reporting that victims from Panama are demanding reparations) (Mar. 1, 2001); Email from Barbara Rose Johnston, AAA Ombudsman to Meg Taylor, IFC
Ombudsman on WCD (Feb. 7, 2001) (on file with author) (discussing the WCD
and Chilean victims' demands for reparations).
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bottom-up decision-making. These methods of decision-making are
applicable to all development decision-makers. Thus, they apply to
corporations, international organizations, governments, and to large
non-governmental organizations. The current structures and
operating principles of many of these institutions are not conducive
to these new ways of decision-making. This suggests that a key issue
for the future will be reforming these institutions to make their
structures and operating principles more compatible with the new
approach to development decision-making.
E. WHAT ROLE FOR LAWYERS'?

Both the modem view of decision-making for development and
the WCD proposal pose important challenges to lawyers. For these
ideas to become operational and for the lessons learned from the
WCD to be usefully applied, lawyers will be needed for a number of
tasks. These include:
o Skilled legal negotiators and drafters will be needed to conclude
negotiated agreements between development decision-makers
and the other stakeholders in their decisions:
o The issue of victim compensation will require lawyers to identify
forums and develop legal theories that these claimants can utilize
to get relief;
o The issue of developing minimally acceptable standards of
compliance with the proposed decision-making framework will
require legal research and analysis of international human rights
and environmental law, as well as skilled legal drafters; and
o The reform of institutions raises interesting issues of corporate
governance, administrative procedure, and international law.
These issues will need to be researched and proposals for reform
will need to be analyzed for consistency with applicable legal
principles.

CONCLUSION
The rapid changes that the world has undergone over the past few
decades have destroyed confidence in the traditional approach to
decision-making for development and rendered it non-viable. So far,
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the international community has been unable to agree upon a new
approach to development decision-making. The WCD's proposed
new framework for decision-making for water and energy
management establishes an important precedent for this broader
debate. It suggests that it is possible to develop a new framework for
development decision-making that is acceptable, at least in principle,
to most stakeholders in the development decision-making debate. It
also demonstrates that this new framework must incorporate many of
the insights of the modern view of development decision-making.
Finally, the WCD proposal challenges all interested parties,
including lawyers, to work to overcome the problems involved in
implementing the WCD's proposed new framework for decisionmaking and to adapt its lessons to the design of a new framework for
all development decision-making.

